Friday, January 22, 2010

Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?

Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?

The summit failed to deliver a way to halt dangerous climate change

About 45,000 travelled to the UN climate summit in Copenhagen - the vast majority convinced of the need for a new global agreement on climate change.

So why did the summit end without one, just an acknowledgement of a deal struck by five nations, led by the US.

And why did delegates leave the Danish capital without agreement that something significantly stronger should emerge next year?

Our environment correspondent Richard Black looks at eight reasons that might have played a part.

1. KEY GOVERNMENTS DO NOT WANT A GLOBAL DEAL

Until the end of this summit, it appeared that all governments wanted to keep the keys to combating climate change within the UN climate convention.

In the end, a deal was struck behind closed doors, not by the conference

Implicit in the convention, though, is the idea that governments take account of each others' positions and actually negotiate.

That happened at the Kyoto summit. Developed nations arrived arguing for a wide range of desired outcomes; during negotiations, positions converged, and a negotiated deal was done.

In Copenhagen, everyone talked; but no-one really listened.

The end of the meeting saw leaders of the US and the BASIC group of countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) hammering out a last-minute deal in a back room as though the nine months of talks leading up to this summit, and the Bali Action Plan to which they had all committed two years previously, did not exist.

THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD


Over the last few years, statements on climate change have been made in other bodies such as the G8, Major Economies Forum (MEF) and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC), which do not have formal negotiations, and where outcomes are not legally binding.

It appears now that this is the arrangement preferred by the big countries (meaning the US and the BASIC group). Language in the "Copenhagen Accord" could have been taken from - indeed, some passages were reportedly taken from, via the mechanism of copying and pasting - G8 and MEF declarations.

The logical conclusion is that this is the arrangement that the big players now prefer - an informal setting, where each country says what it is prepared to do - where nothing is negotiated and nothing is legally binding.

2. THE US POLITICAL SYSTEM

Just about every other country involved in the UN talks has a single chain of command; when the president or prime minister speaks, he or she is able to make commitments for the entire government.

Not so the US. The president is not able to pledge anything that Congress will not support, and his inability to step up the US offer in Copenhagen was probably the single biggest impediment to other parties improving theirs.

Viewed internationally, the US effectively has two governments, each with power of veto over the other.

Doubtless the founding fathers had their reasons. But it makes the US a nation apart in these processes, often unable to state what its position is or to move that position - a nightmare for other countries' negotiators.

3. BAD TIMING

Although the Bali Action Plan was drawn up two years ago, it is only one year since Barack Obama entered the White House and initiated attempts to curb US carbon emissions.

Copenhagen probably came a year too early in Barack Obama's presidency

He is also attempting major healthcare reforms; and both measures are proving highly difficult.

If the Copenhagen summit had come a year later, perhaps Mr Obama would have been able to speak from firmer ground, and perhaps offer some indication of further action down the line - indications that might have induced other countries to step up their own offers.

As it is, he was in a position to offer nothing - and other countries responded in kind.

4. THE HOST GOVERNMENT

In many ways, Denmark was an excellent summit host. Copenhagen was a friendly and capable city, transport links worked, Bella Center food outlets remained open through the long negotiating nights.

Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen (left) chats with fellow ormer COP15 President Connie Hedegaard
Developing nations accused the hosts of holding talks behind closed doors

Climate negotiations 'suspended'

But the government of Lars Lokke Rasmussen got things badly, badly wrong.

Even before the summit began, his office put forward a draft political declaration to a select group of "important countries" - thereby annoying every country not on the list, including most of the ones that feel seriously threatened by climate impacts.

The chief Danish negotiator Thomas Becker was sacked just weeks before the summit amid tales of a huge rift between Mr Rasmussen's office and the climate department of minister Connie Hedegaard. This destroyed the atmosphere of trust that developing country negotiators had established with Mr Becker.

Procedurally, the summit was a farce, with the Danes trying to hurry things along so that a conclusion could be reached, bringing protest after protest from some of the developing countries that had presumed everything on the table would be properly negotiated. Suspensions of sessions became routine.

Despite the roasting they had received over the first "Danish text", repeatedly the hosts said they were preparing new documents - which should have been the job of the independent chairs of the various negotiating strands.

China's chief negotiator was barred by security for the first three days of the meeting - a serious issue that should have been sorted out after day one. This was said to have left the Chinese delegation in high dudgeon.

When Mr Rasmussen took over for the high-level talks, it became quickly evident that he understood neither the climate convention itself nor the politics of the issue. Experienced observers said they had rarely seen a UN summit more ineptly chaired.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that the prime minister's office envisaged the summit as an opportunity to cover Denmark and Mr Rasmussen in glory - a "made in Denmark" pact that would solve climate change.

Most of us, I suspect, will remember the city and people of Copenhagen with some affection. But it is likely that history will judge that the government's political handling of the summit covered the prime minister in something markedly less fragrant than glory.

5. THE WEATHER

Although "climate sceptical" issues made hardly a stir in the plenary sessions, any delegate wavering as to the scientific credibility of the "climate threat" would hardly have been convinced by the freezing weather and - on the last few days - the snow that blanketed routes from city centre to Bella Center.

Reporting that the "noughties" had been the warmest decade since instrumental records began, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) noted "except in parts of North America".

If the US public had experienced the searing heat and prolonged droughts and seriously perturbed rainfall patterns seen in other corners of the globe, would they have pressed their senators harder on climate action over the past few years?

6. 24-HOUR NEWS CULTURE

The way this deal was concocted and announced was perhaps the logical conclusion of a news culture wherein it is more important to beam a speaking president live into peoples' homes from the other side of the world than it is to evaluate what has happened and give a balanced account.
Thousands of journalists covered every twist and turn at the summit

The Obama White House mounted a surgical strike of astounding effectiveness (and astounding cynicism) that saw the president announcing a deal live on TV before anyone - even most of the governments involved in the talks - knew a deal had been done.

The news went first to the White House lobby journalists travelling with the president. With due respect, they are not as well equipped to ask critical questions as the environment specialists who had spent the previous two weeks at the Bella Center.

After the event, of course, journalists pored over the details. But the agenda had already been set; by the time those articles emerged, anyone who was not particularly interested in the issue would have come to believe that a deal on climate change had been done, with the US providing leadership to the global community.

The 24-hour live news culture did not make the Copenhagen Accord. But its existence offered the White House a way to keep the accord's chief architect away from all meaningful scrutiny while telling the world of his triumph.

7. EU POLITICS

For about two hours on Friday night, the EU held the fate of the Obama-BASIC "accord" in its hands, as leaders who had been sideswiped by the afternoon's diplomatic coup d'etat struggled to make sense of what had happened and decide the appropriate response.

The EU called the deal disappointing, so why did the 27-nation bloc accept it?

If the EU had declined to endorse the deal at that point, a substantial number of developing countries would have followed suit, and the accord would now be simply an informal agreement between a handful of countries - symbolising the failure of the summit to agree anything close to the EU's minimum requirements, and putting some beef behind Europe's insistence that something significant must be achieved next time around.

So why did the EU endorse such an emasculated document, given that several leaders beforehand had declared that no deal would be better than a weak deal?

The answer probably lies in a mixture - in proportions that can only be guessed at - of three factors:

• Politics as usual - ie never go against the US, particularly the Obama US, and always emerge with something to claim as a success

• EU expansion, which has increased the proportion of governments in the bloc that are unconvinced of the arguments for constraining emissions

• The fact that important EU nations, in particular France and the UK, had invested significant political capital in preparing the ground for a deal - tying up a pact on finance with Ethiopia's President Meles Zenawi, and mounting a major diplomatic push on Thursday when it appeared things might unravel.

Having prepared the bed for US and Chinese leaders and having hoped to share it with them as equal partners, acquiescing to an outcome that it did not want announced in a manner that gave it no respect arguably leaves the EU cast in a role rather less dignified that it might have imagined.

8. CAMPAIGNERS GOT THEIR STRATEGIES WRONG

An incredible amount of messaging and consultation went on behind the scenes in the run-up to this meeting, as vast numbers of campaign groups from all over the planet strived to co-ordinate their "messaging" in order to maximise the chances of achieving their desired outcome.

The messaging had been - in its broadest terms - to praise China, India, Brazil and the other major developing countries that pledged to constrain the growth in their emissions; to go easy on Barack Obama; and to lambast the countries (Canada, Russia, the EU) that campaigners felt could and should do more.

Now, post-mortems are being held, and all those positions are up for review. US groups are still giving Mr Obama more brickbats than bouquets, for fear of wrecking Congressional legislation - but a change of stance is possible.

Having seen the deal emerge that the real leaders of China, India and the other large developing countries evidently wanted, how will those countries now be treated?

How do you campaign in China - or in Saudi Arabia, another influential country that emerged with a favourable outcome?

The situation is especially demanding for those organisations that have traditionally supported the developing world on a range of issues against what they see as the west's damaging dominance.

After Copenhagen, there is no "developing world" - there are several. Responding to this new world order is a challenge for campaign groups, as it will be for politicians in the old centres of world power.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Scientists are reporting that "biochar" -- a material that the Amazonian Indians used to enhance soil fertility centuries ago -- has potential in the modern world to help slow global climate change. Mass production of biochar could capture and sock away carbon that otherwise would wind up in the atmosphere as carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas.


Their report appears in ACS' Environmental Science & Technology, a bi-weekly journal.

Kelli Roberts and colleagues note that biochar is charcoal produced by heating wood, grass, cornstalks or other organic matter in the absence of oxygen. The heat drives off gases that can be collected and burned to produce energy. It leaves behind charcoal rich in carbon.

Amazonian Indians mixed a combination of charcoal and organic matter into the soil to improve soil fertility, a fact that got the scientists interested in studying biochar's modern potential.

The study involved a "life-cycle analysis" of biochar production, a comprehensive cradle-to-grave look at its potential in fighting global climate change and all the possible consequences of using the material. It concludes that several biochar production systems have the potential for being an economically viable way of sequestering carbon -- permanently storing it -- while producing renewable energy and enhancing soil fertility.
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Story Source:

Adapted from materials provided by American Chemical Society, via EurekAlert!, a service of AAAS.

Journal Reference:

1. Roberts et al. Life Cycle Assessment of Biochar Systems: Estimating the Energetic, Economic, and Climate Change Potential. Environmental Science & Technology, 2010; 44 (2): 827 DOI: 10.1021/es902266r

Sunday, January 17, 2010

Water quality in Ganga at Haridwar poor: NGO

DEHRA DUN: Water quality of the river Ganga in Haridwar is below the standards set by the Central Pollution Control Board for bathing, a recent
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study by an NGO says.

Water has been polluted due to continuous discharge of untreated waste and effluents from various drains directly into the river Ganga, a Dehra Dun-based NGO People's Science Institute said in its study.

Sewage treatment plant (STP) at Jagjeetpur releases about 129 million litres daily (MLD) into the Ganga with a fecal coliform concentration of about 34 million/100ml.

Fecal coliforms are non-sporulating bacteria. Scientists from People's Science Institute (PSI) took samples from 10 drains falling into the river Ganga at different locations in Haridwar on January 2 and 3 this year along with samples of the river water at three locations.

The fecal coliform count of the waste water discharged by the 10 drains ranges from 2.35 million/100ml to 40.6 million/100ml.

The worst situation is the sewer drain at Jwalapur in Balmiki Nagar in the holy town which releases an estimated 15 MLD containing 40.6 million fecal coliforms per 100 ml.

Water samples of Ganga river taken from Saptrishi, Har-Ki-Pauri and Jagjeetpur showed fecal coliforms counts of 1000, 1500 and 7.5 million per 100 ml.

These are well above the prescribed CPCB standard of 500 MPN/100 ml and they pose a health hazard to millions of devotees who are likely to bathe in the river during the Kumbh Mela, PSI Environmental Quality Monitoring Group Head Dr Anil Gautam said.

"The present results do not show any significant improvement in the waste water draining into the Ganga, or the treated effluents emerging from the STP at Jagjeetpur, compared to the results we obtained in July 2009," he said.

"We had circulated our results of July 2009 to all the state legislators and ministers. We received acknowledgements from only two of them, Matbar Singh Kandari and Amrita Rawat, both of whom wrote letters to the Chief Minister Ramesh Pokhriyal," Gautam claimed.

However, no steps have been taken to clean Ganga before the Kumbh Mela, he said.

Monday, January 11, 2010

Lessons Learned from Copenhagen... What you need to know following the Copenhagen climate summit

Co-authored by Rebecca Lefton.

The international negotiations on climate change wrapped up Dec. 19 in Copenhagen. The conference achieved an interim agreement, known as the Copenhagen Accord, which could put the major polluting nations on a pathway to reducing global warming pollution, and it continues to set the expectation for U.S. domestic action on climate change.

Much work remains, but there were also numerous notable achievements and meaningful insights into how the United States can gain from leading the world toward a new international clean-energy agreement.

A “meaningful” deal on climate mitigation

President Barack Obama left Copenhagen Friday night after personally working to secure agreement from China, South Africa, Brazil, and India on a “meaningful and unprecedented” climate change agreement. The president played a major role in crafting the Copenhagen Accord that was hammered out by 28 countries and accepted by 188 by the end of the meeting. Only five countries -- Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Sudan -- refused the accord.

The Accord will go forward with committed parties now required to submit national action plans for emission reductions by the end of January 2010 that are consistent with the agreement’s stated goal of limiting global temperature increases from carbon pollution from rising to more than 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Farenheit) over pre-industrial levels.

The Accord stipulates that countries should consider further strengthening this goal by limiting temperature increases to 1.5 degrees C. Further, specific targets are not iterated in the accord and need to be added as soon as possible, but most parties are committed to strengthening it and taking the next step to turn it into a binding agreement by the 2010 U.N. climate summit in Mexico City.

The existing and proposed policies by the nations that produce large amounts of greenhouse gas pollution provide a good start toward the pollution cuts that we need. The Accord allows nations to undertake a full range of policies that reduce pollution, rather than limiting qualifying policies to economy-wide pollution caps. Preliminary results from a Center for American Progress report on carbon cap equivalents using recent data from Project Catalyst finds that current and pending policies among the world’s 17 major carbon polluters will yield 65 percent of reductions needed by 2020 if all parties succeed in doing what they have promised to do as of today.

Responsibility from developing countries

The Kyoto Protocol called on developed countries to reduce emissions but did not demand reductions from developing countries. Major polluting developing countries, including China, India, South Africa, and Brazil, are now poised to make transparent emissions reductions or reductions in pollution rates. This is the first time that developing countries have agreed to binding emission reductions in an international agreement. This represents a major shift from the schism between developed and developing countries that blocked progress in the past.

First-ever compromise to measure, report, and verify pollution reductions

The Accord includes a compromise between the United States and China to verify pollution reductions according to rigorous and transparent guidelines depending on the source of financing for the reductions. All reductions are subject to “international consultation and analysis.” As a New York Times editorial observed, “China is now a player in the effort to combat climate change in a way it has never been, putting measurable emissions reductions targets on the table and accepting verification.”

Serious emissions reductions targets for developing countries

The ramp up to Copenhagen and the United States’ decision to put midterm emission reductions targets and immediate financing numbers on the table prior to the start of the summit stimulated unprecedented national commitments from key countries. China announced on Nov. 26 a target of reducing carbon pollution per unit of gross domestic product by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. Soon after the U.S.-India summit in Washington, India announced on Dec. 2 that it intends to decrease its carbon intensity 24 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. More importantly, other clean-energy and climate policies in both countries will result in reductions in China of 13 percent below business-as-usual emissions by 2020 and 19 percent below business-as-usual emissions in India by 2020.

Major financial commitments

Developed countries committed significantly more financial resources than ever before to developing countries for mitigation, adaptation, and forest conservation. This was despite disappointments in negotiations over an international forestry deal and an international technology transfer regime. Developments include:

* The Accord establishes a “fast start” fund to provide $30 billion from 2010-2012 for assistance to developing countries, including funds for forestry and a commitment to mobilizing $100 billion a year to address the needs of developing countries by 2020. Japan said that it will provide $15 billion through 2012 toward the fast start fund, contingent on achieving an international agreement. And E.U. leaders will provide $10.5 billion over the next three years as part of the fund. The United States promised a fair share of meeting this goal. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States' funding is contingent on a commitment by developing nations to make emission reductions transparent.
* The United States will finance $1 billion for avoided deforestation that will be matched by other countries for a total of $3.5 billion to prevent the destruction of tropical forests. The global goal is to cut deforestation by half by 2020, which would be equal to eliminating emissions from the entire global transportation sector.
* Energy Secretary Steven Chu announced the launch of the Renewables and Efficiency Deployment Initiative, or Climate REDI, which will contribute $85 million to a global fund of $350 million over five years to assist developing nations with adoption of clean-energy technology. Secretary Chu also announced 10 new clean-energy technology road maps under the Global Partnership, which was launched during the Major Economies Forum in July in L’Aquila, Italy.

A boost to passage of U.S. climate change legislation

As the Washington Post editorial board observed, the Copenhagen Accord “should prod the U.S. Senate to take up climate-change legislation.” President Obama said that we should meet our commitment to reduce pollution, not only because the science demands it, but because it offers enormous economic opportunity to build new clean-energy companies. This first step in Copenhagen commits the United States to passing legislation to make way for an international binding agreement. It is time for the U.S. Senate to continue its international leadership role by acting in 2010, which would create millions of jobs, secure energy independence, and boost the economy.

The primary international opponents of the Copenhagen Accord are oil states

The leading voices of opposition to the Accord came from Venezuela, Sudan, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. The first three nations are oil-producing states that would lose major revenue if countries reduce their global warming pollution by using less oil. The latter two nations are clients of Venezuela that must curry favor with their patron. The ability of a handful of petro-states to block the Accord from being endorsed by the entire U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change at Copenhagen suggests the flawed nature of the United Nations process that requires unanimity among 193 nations. Their opposition will not stop those signing onto the Accord from moving forward and carrying out its mandate, but many observers believe that the outcome of this meeting suggests that alternative venues, such as the Major Economies Forum, which includes the world's largest developed and developing nations polluters, can and should play a larger role in the design and implementation of future agreements.

Rebecca Lefton is a Researcher for Progressive Media, Andrew Light is a Senior Fellow, and Daniel J. Weiss is a Senior Fellow and Director Climate Strategy at the Center for American Progress.

Sunday, January 10, 2010

Pollution control: India ranks 123rd

WASHINGTON: India and China rank 123rd and 121st in pollution control respectively, reflecting the strain rapid economic growth imposes on the
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environment, according to the 2010 Environmental Performance Index (EPI).

However, among the other newly industrialised nations Brazil and Russia rank 62nd and 69th, suggesting that the level of development is just one of many factors affecting pollution control.

Iceland leads the world in addressing pollution control and natural resource management challenges, according to the index produced by a team of environmental experts at Yale University and Columbia University.

Presented Thursday at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2010, the EPI ranks 163 countries on their performance across 25 metrics aggregated into ten categories including environmental health, air quality, water resource management, biodiversity and habitat, forestry, fisheries, agriculture, and climate change.

Iceland's top-notch performance derives from its high scores on environmental public health, controlling greenhouse gas emissions, and reforestation, according to a media release from Yale University. Other high performers include Switzerland, Costa Rica, Sweden, and Norway.

Copenhagen Summit Summary

Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
and
Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
December 7-18, 2009
Copenhagen, Denmark


Download this document as PDF file:
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/copenhagen-cop15-summary.pdf

A new political accord struck by world leaders at the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen provides for explicit emission pledges by all the major economies – including, for the first time, China and other major developing countries – but charts no clear path toward a treaty with binding commitments.

The basic terms of the Copenhagen Accord were brokered directly by President Obama and a handful of key developing country leaders on the final day of the conference, capping two weeks of harsh rhetoric and pitched procedural battles that made the prospect of any agreement highly uncertain. It then took nearly another full day of tense negotiations to arrive at a procedural compromise allowing the leaders’ deal to be formalized over the bitter objections of a few governments.

In the end, parties adopted parallel decisions under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol that “take note” of the political accord and open the way for governments to individually sign on. In separate decisions, parties extended Ad Hoc Working Groups under both the Convention and the Protocol to continue negotiating toward a fuller agreement in late 2010 in Mexico. The unusual set of outcomes leaves uncertainty, however, about the formal standing of the Copenhagen Accord under the U.N. climate process and about the nature of any future agreement. The aim of a “legally binding instrument,” which appeared part of the deal when President Obama first announced it, was later stripped out.

Key elements of the Copenhagen Accord include: an aspirational goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius; a process for countries to enter their specific mitigation pledges by January 31, 2010; broad terms for the reporting and verification of countries’ actions; a collective commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in “new and additional” resources in 2010-2012 to help developing countries reduce emissions, preserve forests, and adapt to climate change; and a goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year in public and private finance by 2020 to address developing county needs. The accord also calls for the establishment of a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, a High Level Panel to examine ways of meeting the 2020 finance goal, a new Technology Mechanism, and a mechanism to channel incentives for reduced deforestation. (See details below).

The Copenhagen conference culminated two years of intense negotiations launched with the 2007 Bali Action Plan. Known formally as the Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 15) and the Fifth Session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 5), the gathering drew a level of political attention well beyond that of any previous climate meeting. Ministers, who ordinarily attend only the final days of the annual COP, arrived the first week hoping to unlock the stalled talks. By its closing days, the summit had drawn well over 100 heads of state and government.

Yet from its opening the conference was marked by bitter divisions, confusion, and setbacks. The Danish government, which had invested extraordinary effort to ensure Copenhagen’s success, found itself undermined from the start by the “leak” of a draft text opposed by developing countries. Though President Obama and other leaders had indicated weeks earlier that they foresaw only a political agreement, the talks were bottled up for days by Tuvalu’s adamant but unsuccessful demand for immediate consideration of a legally binding outcome. A new draft political agreement finally tabled late in the first week was roundly rejected by developed countries. Attempts to break the impasse by referring core issues to smaller groups of countries, rather than continuing to negotiate all issues with all parties, were repeatedly rebuffed by many developing countries, who insisted on full “transparency” and “inclusiveness.”

Those issues continued to dominate in a bitter closing debate as Venezuela, Sudan, Nicaragua, Bolivia and a few others fought to block the leaders’ agreement because most parties were outside the room when it was negotiated. Venezuela declared the agreement a “coup d’etat against the United Nations,” and Sudan likened its effects on poor nations to those of the Holocaust, prompting a round of angry demands that the comment be withdrawn. Though the accord ultimately won formal recognition despite the lack of full consensus, the episode left many privately questioning the prospects for significant further progress within a fully global, procedurally bound U.N. process.

Other dramas in Copenhagen included open squabbling among the typically unified developing country Group of 77, and the struggle between the issue’s two lead protagonists – the United States and China. The two sparred before the press and remained deadlocked behind closed doors until nearly the end. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who arrived ahead of President Obama, upped the pressure by declaring U.S. support for the goal of $100 billion a year for developing countries, an offer that many African and small-island countries did not want to let slip by. It was only then that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei appeared to concede on U.S. demands that its actions be open to some form of international scrutiny.

President Obama closed the deal the next day in a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula, and South African President Jacob Zuma, He then announced the tentative agreement to the press and headed home, leaving other leaders to consider the terms, and weary negotiators to devise the final procedural maneuvers.

Following is a summary of the core outcomes of the Copenhagen conference (full text of all decisions is available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php):

Copenhagen Accord

The Copenhagen Accord is a political (as opposed to legal) agreement of a novel form. Formal decisions under the U.N. climate process are typically taken by consensus. As some parties opposed the accord, the decision entering it into the conference’s proceedings is not technically an acceptance of its substantive content by the Conference of the Parties (or by the parallel Meeting of the Parties under Kyoto). Rather, the decisions by the two bodies only “take note” of the attached accord. Individual countries, in all likelihood a strong majority of the Convention’s 192 parties, will affix their names to the accord in the coming weeks. The accord declares itself “operational immediately,” although many of its provisions will require further elaboration (in some cases explicitly, and in other cases presumably, by the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties). The timeline for doing so is not specified.

In substance, the accord speaks to all of the core elements of the Bali Action Plan: a long-term goal; mitigation; adaptation; finance; technology; forests; and measurement, reporting and verification.

Long-Term Goal – The agreement “recogniz[es] the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius.” It also calls for a review of the accord by 2015, including a consideration of strengthening the long-term goal “in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.”

Mitigation – Under the accord, Annex I (developed) countries “commit to implement” economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, and non-Annex I (developing) countries “will implement mitigation actions.” (Least developed and small island countries “may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.”)

The developed country targets and an initial set of developing country actions are to be entered into two appendices by January 31, 2010. It is widely expected, although not specified in the accord, that the targets and actions entered will be consistent with those floated by governments in the run-up to Copenhagen. Additional developing country actions can be added to the appendix on an ongoing basis. Actions for which developing countries are seeking support are to be recorded in a registry, and those receiving support will later be listed in the developing country appendix.

Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) – The emission targets of Annex I countries, and their delivery of finance for developing countries, will be MRV’d “in accordance with existing and any further guidelines” from the COP. These guidelines are to ensure “rigorous, robust and transparent” accounting of both targets and finance.

Actions by developing countries “will be subject to their domestic” MRV, with the results reported in biennial national communications. The information reported will be subject to “international consultation and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.” Developing country actions receiving international support will be subject to international MRV under guidelines adopted by the COP.

Adaptation – Developed countries “shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable” finance, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation actions in developing countries.

Forestry – The accord declares the “immediate establishment of a mechanism…to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries” to support efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and to enhance forest sinks.

Finance – “Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding” is to be provided to developing countries to support mitigation efforts (including forest-related), adaptation, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building. For the period 2010-2012, developed countries have a “collective commitment” to provide “new and additional resources…approaching USD 30 billion.” Developed countries also commit to a goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion a year by 2020, “in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.” The long-term finance is to be a mix of public (bilateral and multilateral) and private resources.

The accord calls for a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund as one channel for delivering finance and a High Level Panel “to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue” toward the long-term funding goal.

Technology – The agreement establishes a new Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer for both adaptation and mitigation.

Relation to UNFCCC and Kyoto – The accord endorses two parallel decisions under the Convention and the Protocol (see below) extending the two formal negotiating tracks that existed prior to Copenhagen. Those decisions, however, do not cross-reference the accord. Thus, while some parties will likely look to those negotiating processes to elaborate and fully operationalize the accord, no formal link was established.

Ad Hoc Working Group under the Convention

Two years ago in Bali, the COP launched the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) as the forum for negotiating the “agreed outcome” to be adopted in Copenhagen. A set of decisions addressing the core elements of the Bali Action Plan, and a core decision tying them together, were not completed. While parties made modest progress in some areas, many of the draft texts remain heavily bracketed.

The COP adopted a decision forwarding the texts and extending the mandate of the AWG-LCA “with a view to presenting the outcome of its work…for adoption” next year at COP 16. A draft decision circulated at the time President Obama announced the tentative deal described the intended outcome next year as “a legally binding instrument.” However, the phrase did not appear in the text presented at the closing plenary. A number of countries including the United States argued for is reinsertion, but were opposed by others including India and Saudi Arabia.

Ad Hoc Working Group under the Protocol

A parallel Ad Hoc Working Group, the AWG-KP, was established under the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 to consider post-2012 emission targets for developed countries that are party to Kyoto. As with the AWG-LCA, its work remained uncompleted. The Kyoto parties adopted a decision forwarding the incomplete texts and calling on the AWG-KP to complete its work for adoption next year at the meeting of the Kyoto parties to be held in parallel with COP 16.

Dates and Venues of Future Meetings

Parties decided that COP 16/CMP 6 will be held November 29 to December 10, 2010, in Mexico, and that COP 17/CMP 7 will be held November 29 to December 10, 2011, in South Africa.

This summary was written by Elliot Diringer, Vice President for International Strategies, with contributions from International Fellows Kate Cecys and Namrata Patodia, and Daniel Bodansky of the University of Georgia School of Law.

Friday, January 1, 2010

Green Flooring Options

When it’s time to replace flooring, think outside the big box stores. Sustainable flooring is both durable and beautiful.

Cork



Cork is made from the peeled bark of Cork Oak trees, which can be sustainably harvested every nine years without harming the tree. It is naturally resistant to fire, insects, and microbes. Cork is available in snap-together floating floor systems or adhered tile. Showercork is made from ¼” slices of wine cork adhered to a paper backing. It’s designed to be grouted in place and then coated with urethane finish, so it’s especially appropriate for wet areas. Cork flooring is foot-friendly, sound-dampening, and durable.

Earthen Floors



Earthen flooring is earth mixed with fibers, compacted by hand and trowel, and then coated with a natural sealant like hemp or linseed oil. Very high traffic areas may require a flagstone inset. Earthen floors are durable, easily repaired, and kind to feet. Because they are made primarily with materials straight from the building site, their resource impact is near zero. Earthen floors are most often installed over a bed of gravel, but they can be even be layered on top of pre-existing flooring such as concrete or wood, as long as the structure can support the weight of the earth. Because of their high thermal mass, they are ideal for the passive solar home.

Linoleum


Contemporary MarmoleumNatural linoleum is a sustainable alternative to vinyl flooring and requires little maintenance apart from regular sweeping and mopping. A linoleum floor will last 30-40 years, compared to 10-20 years for vinyl flooring. At the end of its lifespan, it is fully biodegradable. Marmoleum, the most popular brand of linoleum, is made of linseed oil from flaxseeds, rosin from pine trees, wood and cork flours, limestone, metal-free pigments, and jute, in a waste-free process. Natural linoleum is available in a rainbow of colors in sheet, tile, or click-style flooring.

Local, Sustainably Harvested or Reclaimed Wood
LemRusticHemlockWant a wood floor? First check with local green builders, who may know locals harvesting their wood sustainably. A local builder may also know sources of reclaimed materials close to home. If you’re looking for a rustic look, try aged wood from barns. Reclaimed wood tells a story, whether it’s maple from a factory floor or flooring from an old bowling alley. Very often, the same dealers who sell reclaimed wood also sell sustainably harvested wood. Forest Stewardship Council certification gives you a starting point for learning about how wood is harvested, although there is the predictable controversy about whether or not their standards are stringent enough.

Woven Bamboo Flooring

Bamboo




Bamboo’s advantage over wood is its fast renewability. It is a grass ready for harvest within three to six years that regenerates without replanting and requires little chemical input. However, due to the recent popularity of bamboo,


corporations are clearing forests in China to plant it. Monocrops of bamboo decrease biodiversity and increase erosion in these clearcut areas. The more industrial bamboo farming becomes, the more chemicals are used to manage the crops. The lesson here is that not all bamboo is created equal. Look for companies like Teragren, who explicitly detail their commitment to sustainability.